





















26the deviating ￿rm with a demand and a pro￿t p ertaining to a high qualit y ￿rm
that confron ts a low qualit y opp onen t quoting price c . This pro￿t is ( p
H
￿ c )(1 +
c ￿ p
H
) ￿ a . Therefore since the play of the equilibrium recommendation implies





￿ c )(1 + c ￿ p
H
) ￿ a ￿ 0: (7.1)
It follo ws that a separating equilibrium exists if the three conditions (A), (B)
and (7.1) are met by ￿
H
.
Note for further reference that the crossing of (7.1) and of a ( p) o ccurs exactly
for a v alue of p
H
= 2(1 + c ) =3 ￿ p
￿
H
, the full information price for ￿rm H.
Therefore the full information price may b e used as a signal if coupled with an
adv ertising campaign costing a ( p
￿
H
). In fact also some slightly low er prices may
b elong to the admissible region for ￿
H
. Recalling form Prop osition 2 that when
c< 1=2 the region for whic h signaling with a p ositiv e adv ertising exists is non-
empt y and it implies a price in [2 c; 1], one can easily c hec k that condition (7.1)
is satis￿ed for some couples ( p
H
;a ) when p
￿
H
2 [2 c; 1], namely when c< 2.
The issue of existence is therefore resolv ed.
One ma y note, to complete the discussion, that there can exist many (in
general an in￿nite num b er of ) equilibria when the regions as describ ed in the
preceding paragraph are non-empt y . While w e do not address here the issue
of selecting among equilibria, it is in teresting to note that solely based on the
c haracterization of equilibria, one can conclude that in some cases equilibria
without adv ertising do not exist.
Of course, like in the case of a monop oly , one can construct b elief systems
that sustain only p o oling equilibria, but since the fo cus here is on separation and
not on the issue of p o oling v ersus separation w e do not pursue a detailed analysis
here.
The system of b eliefs in (i) - (iii) shares a feature that is most general in games
with tw o signal senders, namely that b eliefs dep end up on what b oth play ers do,
or, in short, b eliefs are "correlated".
It is p ossible to generate separating equilibria of this game also by using
systems with "uncorrelated" b eliefs. F or instance, b eliefs of this typ e assign
probabilit y one of b eing H to an y ￿rm playing a strategy that satis￿es some
conditions (in particular (A) and (B)), whatever the other play er do es. Obviously









) = 1. This is v alid only if ! comprises the state (H,H). It is p ossible
to sho w that there exist systems of non correlated b eliefs sustaining separating
equilibria.
25condition is imp osed up on ￿
H
. Of course the equilibria here found satisfy (as all
equilibria m ust) the c haracterization in Section 3 ab o v e based up on conditions
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so as to render as large as p ossible the set of situations in whic h a price alone
strategy of the typ e ￿
H
=( p; 0) can w ork as a signal.
Assume that consumers b eliefs ha ve the follo wing structure. (i) If they ob-
serv e that no ￿rm uses adv ertising and that prices are equal to c at b oth ￿rms
consumers b eliev e that the state is (H,H) . (ii) If only one ￿rm plays ￿
H
and if
this satis￿es (A) and (B) ab o v e, then they b eliev e that this ￿rm is H and the
other is L, unless the other ￿rm also plays either ￿
H
,o r( 0 ; 0) in whic h case they
b eliev e that state is (L,L) . (iii) An y other strategy couple di￿eren t from those








































; (0 ; 0) g and with ￿
H













) )=( 0 ; 0) otherwise.




) so that these





It m ust b e sho wn no w that the equilibrium strategy prescrib e that: if the













=2; 0) by ￿rm L, with ￿
H
satisfying
condition 3.2 , 3.3 and a condition that shall b e de￿ned b elo w; ￿nally , if the state
is (H,H) they are ( c; 0) by eac h ￿rm.





=2; 0) resp ectiv ely . The b est deviations from equilibrium under the assumed
system of b eiefs are ￿
H
for ￿rm L and ( p
H
=2; 0) for ￿rm H. But these deviations
cannot b e pro￿table since ￿
H
satis￿es conditions (A) and (B) ab o v e. This couple
of actions is therefore a couple of m utual b est replies.
Second, if the state is (L,L) then the play of a null price and of no adv ertising
by b oth ￿rms m ust constitute a couple of b est replies: if a ￿rm deviates to an y
other strategy with a p ositiv e price it shall still b e p erceiv ed as L, therefore it
cannot increase its pro￿t ab o v e zero. Therefore the couple ((0 ; 0) ; (0 ; 0)) is a
couple of m utual b est replies.
It remains to b e v eri￿ed whether under the state (H,H) the candidate that the
b eliefs prop ose, namely the couple (( c; 0) ; ( c; 0)) is a pair of m utual b est replies.
It is immediate to see that the only p ossible deviation left to either ￿rm by the
b eliefs is the play of strategy ￿
H
instead of ( c; 0). That deviation generates an
observ ation of the kind listed in (ii) in the b elief system, and therefore a￿ords
246. App endix 1
Pro of of Prop osition 1
Pro of: Supp ose that ( p; a ) satis￿es b oth (i) and (ii). Supp ose further that
( p; 0) do es not satisfy either one or b oth (i) and (ii). Since ( p; a ) satis￿es (ii)
(1 + v ￿ p)( p ￿ c ) ￿ a ￿ v + c ￿ 0 then, a fortiori (1 + v ￿ p)( p ￿ c ) ￿ v + c ￿ 0.
The low est v alue of a that can b e asso ciated to p is therefore giv en by (i) and
is (1 + v ￿ p) p ￿ v ￿ a
+
. Then, assume ￿ =( p; a
+
) . By contin uit y of the
function (1 + v ￿ p) p there exists a price p
0









; 0) , whic h v eri￿es constrain t (i), is used
instead of ￿ . Constrain t (ii) for ￿
0




￿ c ) ￿ v + c ￿
0. Since ￿ satis￿es (ii), for this inequalit y to b e v eri￿ed, it is su￿cien t that




￿ c ) ￿ v + c ￿ (1 + v ￿ p)( p ￿ c ) ￿ v + c ￿ a
+
. But this writes as




￿ c (1 + v ￿ p
0
) ￿ v ￿￿ (1 + v ￿ p) c or (1 + v ￿ p
0
) ￿ (1 + v ￿ p) , whic h
is true since p
0
>p and since b oth expressions in paren theses are non-negativ e.
The argumen t applies also for all strategies (p,a) with a> v
+
and it is therefore
complete. 2
Pro of of Lemma 1:
Pro of: Supp ose that at an equilibrium ￿rm L plays an action ￿
0
di￿eren t from ￿
L
when the state is (H,L). By de￿nition of a Separating
Equilibrium ￿rm L is p erceiv ed as L and its opp onen ta s H . H o w e v er,
by deviating to strategy ￿
L
, if it is still p erceiv ed as L with probabilit y
one it will play according to its b est reply against ￿
H
, and if it is
p erceiv ed as L with probabilit y less than one, it will receiv e a higher
demand than if it is with probabilit y one, and its pro￿t will increase,




7. App endix 2: Existence
The necessary conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are suf-
￿cien t to c haracterize the nature of the signal used, but are not su￿cien t to
guaran tee existence in general. Recall furthermore that the analysis has b een so
far concerned only with the actions prescrib ed in states (H,L) and (L,H) , and the
other actions ha ve b een left unsp eci￿ed.
The presen t Section ￿lls this gap and sho ws that existence is guaran teed, in
one of the simplest b elief systems that can b e en visaged, if only an additional
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21More generally , the imp ortance of a low price in a comp etitiv e framew ork
is quite ob vious, while it is not so in the context of a monop oly . By fo cussing
on the single-￿rm problem some authors ha v e stressed the imp ortance of low
in tro ductory prices as a signaling p olicy (see Sc hmalensee[1978]), while others
hav e attributed more imp ortance to high-price p olicies as signaling devices (see
Bagw ell and Riordan[1991]). The explanation w e use here do es not con￿ict with
either those views of low (or of high) in tro ductory prices as signals, although
w e stress the imp ortance of adv ertising comp onen ts of a signaling strategy that
al low a price p olicy to b e a signal
21
. In our example a price higher than the
full information price|when rev elation is sp on taneous the full information price
itself|ma y signal without adv ertising. But there are situations where adv ertising
is ne c essary for prices higher than, equal to, or low er than the full information
price to separate.
The old idea that the en try of new ￿rms may b e deterred through adv ertising
￿nds its coun terpart in our mo del in the idea that signaling through adv ertising
allows a low er price than signaling through price alone and reduces the mark et
share for the riv als. The low qualit y ￿rm by adv ertising can use a price low
enough to discourage en try of a ￿rm with a still low er qualit y , while without
adv ertising the same price cannot deter the en tran ts.
This typ e of adv ertising is most likely to contin ue o ver time and to v ary in
a pro-cyclical fashion, as it is directed not so m uc h to separate one incum b en t
from another incum b en t but to discourage, through time, the mimic king from
p otential en tran ts.
21
The signaling role of prices is also the fo cus of W olinski [1983] and Co op er and Ross [1984].
In these works, howev er, some consumers are informed ab out pro duct qualities or can acquire
information at a cost (i.e. the pro duct is a searc h go o d). The question there studied is then the
exten t to which equilibrium prices transmit information from informed to uninformed agents.
It is high prices that hav e receiv ed the most atten tion in those works.
20Finally , assume that the mark et size increases or decreases o v er time as in a
cyclical b ehavior of demand. F or instance assume that the mass of consumers is
M
t
where the subscript t denotes a date. If adv ertising is used as an en try barrier,
then it p ersists; ho we v er it m ust also v ary according to demand conditions: the


















v aries along the cycle so v aries the minim um amoun t of adv ertising of
￿rm L.
As a conclusion w e get that advertising varies pr o-cyclic al ly .
5. Concluding remarks on adv ertising, signaling, and price
p olicy
When adv ertising is used as an en try barrier, since in that case it is clear that
a price-alone strategy can alwa ys b e mimic k ed by an en tran t of low er qualit y ,i t
arises as a natural equilibrium b ehavior. When it is just used by a high qualit y to
separate from a low qualit y its relative merits o v er a price-alone strategy should
b e in tuitiv ely explained as they seem to apply for the duop oly and not for the
monop oly case.
Note ￿rst that to obtain separation when one ￿rm is of high qualit y and the
other is of low qualit y the former m ust discourage imitation by visibly w asting
some resources. This can b e done by an abnormal increase (for the case of a
decrease in price see comments b elo w) in price, or by adding the ￿xed costs of an
adv ertising campaign. A high price, ho we v er is painful in terms of lost customers
that switc h to the riv al supplier. This e￿ect is larger the more elastic is the
￿rm’s demand to the price di￿erence. F or high enough prices if qualit y do es
not command a high premium the high qualit y is out of the mark et and cannot
separate. The qualit y premium for ￿rm H in our mo del is higher (in p ercen tage
terms) the low er is the parameter v . A high v induces a low p ercen tage di￿erence










) =( v ￿ p
L
). This accoun ts in part for the
di￿cult y to obtain separation through a high price and no adv ertising when v is
high. By using adv ertising and an appropriate price together, the high qualit y
￿rm ma y succeed in discouraging imitation without raising its price to o m uc h
ab o v e that of the riv al.
Second, the price of the low qualit y ￿rm at a separating equilibrium is a
decreasing function of the price of the high qualit y ￿rm (in monop oly this is not
so). This means that the low er the price that is used by the latter for separation,
the low er the margins that it can enjoy by imitating the low qualit y ￿rm. This
mak es it easier for the high qualit y to b e discouraged from mimic king the low
qualit y . Also in this resp ect the use of adv ertising, since it allows a reduction in
the signaling price of the high qualit y ￿rm renders the separation easier.
19u
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=0 : 5[ v ￿ p
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￿ (0 : 5) v . The total demand addressed to the tw o ￿rms L and
0 is therefore equal to m
￿
.







). A necessary condition for this strategy to deter
the ￿yer-b y-the-nigh t is that if this en ters and plays exactly ￿
L
it mak es a loss.















The R.H.S. in the inequalit y ab o v e is justi￿ed by the fact that the full infor-
mation price and pro￿t of a ￿op is zero. The L.H.S. is simply the pro￿t of a ￿op




) against a ￿rm







= 0 the ￿yer-by-the-nigh t alwa ys ￿nds it pro￿table to en ter so that
adv ertising is necessary for ￿rm L to k eep the ￿op out
20
. Obviously , a necessary
condition for the low qualit y ￿rm to separate from the ￿op through adv ertising is
that by so doing it mak es a pro￿t higher than if it accommo dates the en try of the












And the price p
L
that maximizes this pro￿t is equal to p
‘
￿ (1 =2)( p
H
￿ v= 2). A
deviation from the en try prev en ting price p
L

































Finally , the b ehavior of ￿rm H m ust assure that ￿rm L do es not w an tt o

















again is the no-jamming condition).
The lesson fr om this se c ond example is that the the ory her e exp ose dc an ac-
c ount for (i) low quality ￿rms advertising to gether with high quality ￿rms, (2)
persistenc eo f b oth ￿rms advertising over time.
Note that the existence region for high-price and no adv ertising for ￿rm H
shrinks further if the low qualit y ￿rm adv ertises. In fact the L.H.S. of all con-
ditions (A) and (B) is low ered by the ￿xed amoun t a
L
, so that the incentiv e
constrain t a
z
( p) is shifted upw ard, and the range of v -v alues that are larger than
the ro ot z
c




When the state is (L,L,0) the two ￿rms of typ e L can deter the en try of the third ￿rm by






























), at which b oth ￿rms mak e zero pro￿ts.
18of "w aste" that p ersists o v er time as it m ust signal to new consumers at eac h
p erio d. Similarly , the rep etition of promotion campaigns on television by some
brands ma y ha v e the same function. F urthermore, as it shall b e sho wn b elo w
p ersistence can o ccur when renown brands ma y b e induced to adv ertise in order
to deter the en try of other ￿rms.
4. Adv ertising as an En try Barrier
Assume there is a third ￿rm in addition to the tw o previously considered. This
￿rm is a pro ducer of low est qualit y , in the sense that it can b e one of tw o typ es:







.T o simplify matters assume that a ￿op can nev er b e mistak en
for a high qualit y pro duct, but it is indistinguishable from a low qualit y pro duct,
an assumption that could b e relaxed in a more complete v ersion of this game.
T o k eep with the approac h of short term in teraction, w e assume that the
en try , price, and adv ertising decisions are all sim ultaneously taken. If w e had
assumed rep eat purchase, and a m ulti-p erio d framework, it w ould b e p ossible to
mo dify the example here in order to consider the b ehavior of incum b en ts against
p otential en tran ts.
In this game it is common kno wledge that there can b e such a pro ducer,
called a "￿y er-by-the-nigh t", in the sense that ev eryb o dy kno ws that if three
￿rms are on the mark et one could b e a ￿op and m ust lea v e the mark et after
having deceiv ed consumers once. W e shall concen trate on the asymmetric states
(H,L,0) and those obtained p erm uting the order of the en tries. Since qualit y H
cannot by hyp othesis b e imitated by the ￿op, in these states the ￿op m ust imitate
the low qualit y if it w an ts to en ter. Then if the state (H,L,0) realizes ￿rm L has
to prev en t the ￿op from en tering
19
.
If the typ e 0 ￿rm en ters and replicates the strategy of ￿rm L then consumers
cannot distinguish whic h ￿rm is L and whic h is the ￿op. Firm H, by contrast
ma y separate from ￿rm L using a strategy that can b e describ ed analogously to
what has b een done ab o v e so as to prev en t ￿rm L from imitating|for brevity w e
do not re-state the conditions (A) and (B) for this game.
Note that if the ￿op en ters and imitates ￿rm L, then this ￿rm and the ￿op
are b oth b eliev ed to b e ￿ops with probabilit y 0.5 and will share the demand
addressed to the corresp onding exp ected qualit y as it shall b e brie￿y sho wn.
The consumers kno w that there is at most one ￿op, hence their exp ected utilit y








Under the assumption that a high qualit y cannot b e mistak en with a ￿op, when the state
is (H,H,0) the ￿yer{b y-the-nigh t cannot en ter. If the state is (L,L,0) , under rev elation one
would observ e adv ertising from b oth lo w quality ￿rms, as it is brie￿y explained in the follo wing
fo otnote. Finally , if the state is (L,L,L) all ￿rms pla y the Bertrand equilibrium with a price
equal to marginal cost (here zero) and no adv ertising.
17As an informal pro of for the case c< 0: 5 consider the graph represen ted in the
left part of Figure 4, whic h has b een dra wn for a v alue of v>2, and of c =0 : 25:
the curv e a ( p) is recognized as starting from the origin, and A ( p) starts from the




) = 0. The tw o constrain ts there cross at the p oint where
p
H
=2 c , and at the p oint where p
H
= 1. It can b e sho wn that for c< 1=2 these
crossings o ccur in the same w a y as depicted in that graph
17
, i.e. one has that for
p
H
in the range [2 c; 1] the inequalit y A ( p) >a holds, while outside that range the
opp osite inequalit y holds (the right hand graph in Figure 4 has b een dra wn for a
v alue of c = 0, the v alid region shrinks in size as c is increased form zero to 0.5).
It follo ws that in general, for c< 1=2, the region to whic h a separating strategy
￿
H
m ust b elong is formed by (i) a non-empt y region where adv ertising is strictly
p ositiv e; (ii) a (p ossibly empt y) region consisting of all p oints on the abscissa
lying in the in terv al [ v; z ( c )]. This pro v es the ￿rst part of the Prop osition.
(T o pro v e the part of the prop osition regarding the case c> 1=2 consider Figure
5, whic h has b een dra wn under the hyp othesis that c =0 : 7. It is apparen t
from Figure 5 that if v> 2, then a separating equilibrium if it exists is giv en
by the p oint of tangency of A ( p
H
) and a ( p
H
). The same situation arises for all
v alues of c ￿ 0: 5, b ecause for these v alues one can easily c hec k that A ( p
H
) has
a unique maximum at the p oint where p
H
=2 c , and that at p
H
=2 c one has
a ( p
H
)= A ( p
H
), so that the equilibrium ￿
H
is unique in these cases
18
). 2
W e will ￿nally note that a price couple equal to the full information prices
for the high and low qualit y may b e used at a separating equilibrium if the high
qualit y ￿rm accompanies the full information price by an adequate exp enditure
in adv ertising. F or instance, for c =0 : 25 one has that p
￿
H
=5 =6 and a = a
s
(5 =6)
ma y constitute a separating strategy ￿
H
for H.
The imp ortan t feature of the results so far obtained is that they , in the same
line as for the monop oly case, establish a char acterization of equilibria, preceding
a complete sp eci￿cation of b eliefs.
Existence is discussed in App endix 2.
3.4. Persistence
As it is clear, the plausibilit y that adv ertising m ust b e used in a one-shot set-up,
implies that it can b e used also in situations where rep eat purchase is not presen t.
F or instance in the case of the restauran ts quoted in the In tro duction. The










; all cross; p
H
= 1 is alw a ys one of the




, and it is the largest ro ot for c<1 = 2.
18
When c = 1 then 2 c = 2 and the p oin t of tangency of the two constrain ts implies that
p
H
=2 . F or c>1 the two constrain ts do not touc h any more since A(p
H
) < 0 for c> 1, so
that the separating equilibria with adv ertising do not exist for these v alues of c .























































=2 c so that A ( p
H
) is contin uous
15
.F urthermore 2 c




> 0: 5. While for c< 0: 5 the maximum is at
the right of p
H





The in terpla y of the curv es a ( p
H
) and A ( p
H
) determines the regions in the
space of ( p
H
;a ) couples to whic h the separating strategy ￿
H
; in state (H,L) or
(L,H), m ust necessarily b elong if a separating equilibrium of the game exists.
Note, to start, that if v<2 strategies in v olving a zero amoun t of adv ertising
and that satisfy the constrain t derived by condition (A) alwa ys exist. If and
only if A ( p
H
) in tersects the horizontal axis to the right of v
16
,h o we v er, there are
price-alone strategies that also satisfy constrain t (B).
F or the purp oses of the presen t Section|namely to demonstrate that the
p ossibilit y of adv ertising enlarges the set of parameter ranges for whic h separation
ma y o ccur o v er and ab o v e the range for whic h separation ma y obtain through
prices only|it is su￿cient to sho w that, when v>min f z ( c ) ; 2g , there exist
ranges for the cost parameter c for whic h a strategy ￿
H
with strictly p ositiv e
adv ertising satis￿es necessary conditions (A) and (B).
Prop osition 3. F or c< 1 and v> min f z ( c ) ; 2g the only non-trivial separating
equilibria that ma y exist in v olv e a strictly p ositiv e lev el of adv ertising in the states
(L,H) and (H,L). F urthermore, for c <1/2 the high qualit y ￿rm has a strictly
p ositiv e pro￿t, while for c ￿ 1/2 its pro￿ts are null but its mark et share p ositiv e.
14
The pro￿t to ￿rm H if the equilibrium strategies are pla y ed is






= 2) ￿ a =( p ￿ c )(1 ￿ p
H
= 2) ￿ a:























The righ t hand term is zero if p
H
< 2 c , that is when ￿rm H would mak e negativ e pro￿ts if
it deviated to the price of its riv al, but just needs to mak e non-negativ e pro￿ts.
15




]o v er the relev ant range and so it can b e
more easily retained.
16




), denoted z (c )=
1
4
(3 + 2 c +
p
9 ￿ 4 c + c
2
)
is larger than v .(Note that for all c>0, z (c ) >c and that the ro ots of a
y
(c ) are c and 2).
15Proposition 2: If v>2 then no str ate gy with zer o advertising c an achieve
sep aration.
In fact if v>2 the only prices that can signal ￿rm H in the state (H,L) are
higher than 2, but then this ￿rm receiv es zero demand as stated in Subsection
3.1 ab o v e, and the equilibrium. The fact that a high v alue of v destro ys the
equilibria where price-alone strategies are used can b e in terpreted economically .
W e lea v e this discussion ho we v er for the concluding Section.
It is no w p ossible to ask whether with v>2 adv ertising can separate where
price-alone strategies cannot. Let us turn no w for this purp ose to the implications
of condition (B).































Note to start that the demand to ￿rm H (and to ￿rm L) in state (H,L) if H plays
the same strategy as ￿rm L, should in general b e determined by the b eliefs held




) is observed. How ev er, in the case here
analyzed the matter is simpli￿ed by Lemma 1: since L plays according to its full
information b est resp onse to p
H
, it is nev er the case that p
L
>v . If b oth ￿rms
play p
L
, therefore, all consumers buy ev en if they think that the state is (L,L) ,





b eliefs are irrelevan t here, and the tie is broken as it is customary by assuming
that demand is split in equal parts
13
.
Condition (B) describ es a function, A ( p
H
), that de￿nes the maximal amoun ts
of adv ertising consistent with separation. This function lo oks generically as a
quasi-conca v e function with a kink at the p oint where p
H
=2 c , (see discussion
13
In a mo del where D
L
(p ) has no vertical sections, but it is downw ard sloping wherev er it is









) = 0 pla ys for condition (A). The calculations would only b ecome less straightforw ard
while the main conclusions would not b e altered.






￿ a , where b represen ts the b eliefs held by consumers.
Then for p
H

















Conditions (3.6) and (3.7) when com bined de￿ne a contin uous function a ( p
H
),
whic h is conca v e shaped and it has a kink in corresp ondence of p
H
= v , as depicted
in Figure 3. The graph of the function to the right of v is shifted, with its piv ot
in the p oint with co ordinates ( v; a ( v )), in the right direction as b increases from
0t o1 . F or b = 0 it coincides with the horizontal axis
12
, in fact, p
b
= v for b =0
and p
b
>v for b> 0.
The function a ( p
H
) delimits the low er b ound for a in a separating strategy
￿
H
for an y giv en level of p
H
.
Third, and ￿nally , note that the range of prices for whic h a high price and
no adv ertising strategy can separate is the in terv al of prices at the right of the
in tersection of the curv e a ( p
H
) with the price axis. Since this in tersection mo v es




) is increased, the range of prices that can separate without




). T o get the desired result,




) = 0 so as to "consider the less fa v orable case for
the necessit y of adv ertising".





Note that under this assumption the function a ( p
H





) only if v<2, in whic h case it lo ok as in the right graph depicted









, as depicted in Figure 4 b elo w.
A ￿rst condition for a price-alone strategy to w ork as a signal is that the price
is higher than v (and in particular higher than p
b
if violating Assumption 2 one
had b> 0). Notice inciden tally that such a price may b e higher than the full




2(1 + c ) =3.
Simply lo oking at Figure 3 it is clear that if v is larger than 2 then a price-
alone strategy implies p
H
> 2 and therefore it yields zero demand to ￿rm H.
Then w e can state
12












































). Then, recalling that
d
H

























)=0 i f p> p
b
.
133) W e analyze condition (B) and sho w that when separation fails through price-
alone strategies it can b e obtained with a p ositiv e level of adv ertising exp endi-
tures.
T o b egin with, let de￿ne a strategy for a ￿rm as a function that describ es its
c hoice of action for eac h giv en state of nature|￿rms mo v e sim ultaneously after
the state is c hosen by Nature. An action is a couple ( p; a ) constituted by a price
and a lev el of ￿xed cost adv ertising, a , with a ￿ 0. First, it is useful to state the
follo wing result.
Lemma 1: Indep enden tly of the consumers’ system of b eliefs, at a separating







Pro of: see App endix 1.
Obviously this result greatly simpli￿es the analysis. The strategy play ed by ￿rm

















Let us analyze the implications of condition (A) for our duop oly example.
If ￿rm L imitates the price and adv ertising ￿ used by ￿rm H then consumers









for the c haracterization of the separating strategies and to c ho ose the v alue for
it that do es not in terfere with the results.




), then the consumer’s utilit y from buying when b oth













is, shortening the notation, b ( v + m ￿ p)+ ( 1 ￿ b )( v ￿ p). This implies that the
consumer indi￿eren t b et w een buying and not buying is m
b
=( p ￿ v ) =b . So that
total demand is D
b
=1 + v= b ￿ p=b if p> v and it is D
b
=1 i f p< v
11
.
Second, going back to condition A (no-jamming), for a couple of price and
adv ertising ( p
H
;a ), used by ￿rm H , if p
H
<v , then all consumers buy one
unit, and demand to eac h ￿rm is 1/2, so that if it plays ￿
H

























(and zero adv ertising)













. In the case p
H
<v , then the v alue of p
H












Note that for p
H
>v condition A do es not write as in (3.6) ab o v e, b ecause
demand is not inelastic to price as not all consumers necessarily buy . The L.H.S.
11
Note that the demand D
b
corresp onds to demand D
H
of Section 2, when b = 1, and to D
L
when b = 0. While its elastic part rotates downw ard as b is decreased form 1 to zero.





the signal sent by ￿rm H. But it do es not necessarily imply that L is p erceiv ed
as H by consumers: whether on or out the equilibrium path, in fact, observing
￿
H
at b oth ￿rms ma y not lead to the b elief that with probabilit y one the state
is ( H; H ).
These tw o prop erties lead, taken in turn, to tw o necessary conditions on the
equilibrium strategies.










)) denote the pa y o￿ to ￿rm of typ e




play ed by its riv al of typ e k ,












































Recall again that the analysis is, for the time b eing, concerned with the prop-
erties of the strategies play ed when the state is (L,H) or (H,L) in a separating
equilibrium. These tw o conditions are necessary , for any giv en b elief system im-








). If it is p ossible to sho w
that the c hoice of these tw ov alues is irrelev an t for the follo wing results then the




3.3. Necessary conditions and signaling
The plan of the argumen t in this subsection is the follo wing:










) = 0 and sho w that with price-alone strategies separation
cannot alwa ys obtain.
9
The term signal jamming is used by F udenb erg and Tirole 1986, in a con text where an
informed pla y er ma y prev ent another uninformed pla y er from observing a signal .
10




are by de￿nition part of a separating equilibrium they rev eal
the state (H,L) or (L,H) and there is no c hoice but 0 or 1, as it applies, for the R.H.S in the
inequalities in (A) and (B).
11attributed to the ev en t that ￿rms i and j b e the high qualit y ￿rm. The equiv alence
of the tw o represen tations is self evident. F or our conv enience w e adopt the
second.


















is formidable. Luc kily it is p ossible to obtain results that are b elief-indep enden t,
in the sense that they apply to an y system of b eliefs that sustain a separating
equilibrium. This exempts us from the task of justifying the c hoice of a particular
structure of b eliefs for the results that shall b e obtained in the presen t Section.






) denotes the proba-





by ￿rm j. The notation mak es it clear that ￿rms are symmetric in the
sense that for an y ￿ , one has b
i
( ￿ j ￿ )= b
j
( ￿ j ￿ ), i.e. that ￿rms are assigned
the same b elief when they play iden tical strategies
7
. Even if this is an ob vious
prop ert y w e state it formally for conv enience:
Prop ert y 1 : If the ￿rms adopt identic al str ate gies then the c onsumers b eliefs assign
to either ￿rm an identic al pr ob ability of b eing of high quality.













)) to eac h strategy pro￿le; (ii) the ￿rms play pure strategies
that lead to a di￿eren t action pro￿le in eac h state; (iii) b eliefs are consistent with
the ￿rms’ strategies
8





that m ust b e play ed at a sep arating e quilibrium when the realized state is (H,L)
or (L,H)| the strategies that are play ed at the other states of Nature do not




) that are discussed here.
(A) First, it m ust b e a prop ert y of an y separating equilibrium of the game
that when the state is (L,H) or (H,L) the ￿rm of typ e L m ust not ￿nd it
conv enien t to deviate, from the action ￿
L
that the equilibrium prescrib es,
to the use of the action ￿
H
that is prescrib ed for the typ e-H ￿rm.
(B) Second, it m ust b e a prop ert y of an y separating equilibrium that when the
state is (L,H) or (H,L) the ￿rm of typ e H has no incen tiv e to deviate from
the equilibrium prescription ￿
H
and use the strategy ￿
L
that is prescrib ed
to ￿rm L.
7













restriction is quite natural it is not necessary for the analysis here p erformed, ad it is therefore
not used.
8
Note that p oin t (i) in the de￿nition excludes partially separating equilibria, i.e. equilibria





= v otherwise. A Nash equilibrium in prices under full information,
with b oth ￿rms enjoying a p ositiv e mark et share
5
, and p ositiv e pro￿ts o ccurs if















2(1 + c )
3
;




When the crossing of the tw o reaction functions o ccurs at this p oint b oth ￿rms
enjoy a p ositiv e mark et share (see Figure 2 for an example). This is p ossible if and
only if c and v are in the set S de￿ned by S = f( c; v ) j c 2 [0 ; 2] ;v ￿ (1 + c ) =3g
6
.
It is henceforth assumed:
Assumption 1 : ( c; v ) 2S .
3.2. Necessary Conditions
T o analyze the duop oly case w e shall use a metho dology that parallels as close as
p ossible the one traditionally used for the monop oly . First the necessary condi-
tions for separation shall b e determined, then a c haracterization of the separat-
ing equilibria is derived, and ￿nally (in an App endix) the existence of separating
equilibria is demonstrated.
Unlik e in the monop oly case the consumers observe tw o couples of price-
adv ertising strategies, one for eac h ￿rm. There are four states of Nature: (L,L)
designs the state where b oth ￿rm are of typ e L, (L,H) and (H,L) design the
states where one ￿rm is H and the other is L, (H,H) designs the state where
b oth are of typ e H. Let ! denote the set of states that are admissible, here let
therefore b e ! = f ( L; L ) ; ( L; H ) ; ( H; L ) ; ( H; H ) g . A t the ￿rst stage of the game
Nature c ho oses a state and only the tw o ￿rms observe Nature’s mo v e, they then




) : Finally ,a t
the third stage, consumers form b eliefs and purchase from one or the other ￿rm.
There are at least tw o equiv alentw a ys of represen ting b eliefs. The ￿rst assigns




) play ed by the tw o ￿rms, i and j , a four dimensional
v ector of probabilities, one for eac h state. The second assigns to eac h strategy












)) that represen ts the probabilities
5
W e are not in terested to equilibria where only one ￿rm survives, for this reason also we
hav e not in tro duced ￿xed costs in the cost functions. Note that in the example here treated the
lo w qualit y ￿rm at equilibrium alw a ys enjoys a p ositiv e mark et share, while the high qualit y











￿ v . The price of ￿rm H is
higher than c if c<
2(1+ c )
3







) is equal to (1 ￿ ((1 + c )= 3)), the condition c< 2 also guaran tees that this b e
p ositiv e. Whence the de￿nition of the set S in the text.
93. Duop oly
3.1. The structure of comp etition under full information
Before the study of the signaling game describ ed in the In tro duction ab o ve , i t i s
necessary to brie￿y presen t the full information results of comp etition in duop oly .
Assume that the cost conditions are the same as for the monop oly case, again
without loss of generalit y , assume that c
L
= 0. Let the buyer’s utilit y b e describ ed
by the expressions (2.1) and (2.2) ab o v e. The consumer that is indi￿eren t b et w een



























) = min f1 ￿ p
H
+ min [ p
L
;v ] ; 1g ; if p
H


















) = 0 for p
H
￿ 2.






















) = 0 otherwise.
The tw o demand functions are depicted in Figure 1.




=( 1 =2)(1 + p
L
+ c ) ; if max [ c ￿ 1; 0] ￿ p
L
￿ v; (3.3)
if by contrast p> v , then ￿rm L has zero demand and ￿rm H reaction function




=( 1 =2)(1 + v + c ) ; if p
L
>v :
Finally , if ￿rm L quotes a price low er than c ￿ 1 then ￿rm H cannot quote a price
equal to (1 =2)(1 + p
L




= c for c ￿ 1 ￿ p
L
.













8(ii) states that a strategy ￿ can b e part of a separating equilibrium only if the
monop olist has no incentiv e to deviate from the play of ￿ to the play of ( v; 0)
if the qualit y is high. Note that, as Milgrom and Rob erts[1986] sho w, although
man y other deviations are p ossible from the equilibrium prescription, the tw o
deviations here stated are generally regarded as crucial. In fact it is generally the
case that one can ￿nd a system of b eliefs that supp orts the play of ￿ in state (H)
and of ( v; 0) in state (L) if ￿ satis￿es the tw o conditions (i) and (ii).
The c haracterization of ￿ is usually the fo cus of the analysis, since it c har-
acterizes the typ e of signal used. In general ￿ is not uniquely iden ti￿ed by the
constrain ts, while these rather iden tify a set of regions in the space of couples
( p; a ) to whic h ￿ m ust b elong. In this resp ect the follo wing result indicates that
the use of adv ertising is not essential for separation.
Prop osition 1 : Under monop oly if there exists a strategy ￿ =( p; a ) with a> 0,





satisfying the same constrain ts.
Pro of: See the App endix.
Note that Prop osition-1 can b e in terpreted as follo ws: the existence of a
separating equilibrium, under monop oly and in a one-shot game, do es not impinge
on the p ossibilit y of adv ertising; in other terms, the p ossibilit y to adv ertise do es
not enlarge the sp ectrum of circumstances under whic h separation ma y o ccur.
This ho we v er do es not mean that adv ertising can b e excluded on some game
theoretic ground b ecause to do that one needs use of an equilibrium selection
criterion. This is done in Milgrom and Rob erts[1986] who sho w that adv ertising
resists the application of standard re￿nements criteria only if rep eat purchase is
assumed, and w e do not restate the argumen t here.
There is an economic reason, ho we v er, wh y adv ertising is not necessary: it is
more costly to signal through adv ertising than through price. The pro of of this
statemen t is simple: de￿ne a ( p) = (1 + v ￿ p) p ￿ v . F or an y giv en price this
function giv es the minimal amoun t of adv ertising that is necessary to separate.
Then, maximize the pro￿t of the high qualit y monop olist with resp ect to price
and adv ertising under the constrain t that a ￿ max [0 ;a ( p)]. This is equiv alent
to maximize with resp ect to p the function ￿( p) = (1 + v ￿ p) p ￿ a ( p)o ver the




is the highest ro ot of 0 = (1 + v ￿ p) p ￿ v . Since
a ( p) is monotone decreasing in p, and since ￿
0
( p) > 0 the pro￿t so written is
increasing in price, so that a maximum obtains at p
a
with a ( p
a
)= 0 .
Saying it di￿eren tly , consider again the separation constrain t (i) ab o v e. Since
adv ertising adds to the costs of a high qualit y monop oly as m uc h as it adds to
those of a low qualit y it is relatively easier to imitate than a p olicy of high price:
the latter is more costly in terms of lost pro￿t (unit margin times demand) for
a monop oly of low qualit y , who pro duces at a low marginal cost, than for one of
high qualit y , who pro duces at a high marginal cost.
7where v is a p ositiv e constan t, p
H
is the price paid to the seller, and m is a
taste parameter, ranging in the unit in terv al [0 ; 1], uniformly distributed o ver
this range so that the consumers p opulation has unit mass. If a consumer do es
not buy her utilit y is zero. The consumer that is indi￿eren t b et w een buying or
not a high qualit y pro duct has taste parameter m = p
H
￿ v . The demand to the





) = min [1 + v ￿ p
H
; 1]




=0 i f 1 + v ￿ p
H
.
If the go o d is of low qualit y , then utilit y is assumed to b e in v arian t with m
and to b e giv en by
u
L
= v ￿ p
L
: (2.2)
Therefore demand to the monop olist of low qualit y under p erfect information is
D
L




=0 i f v< p
H
.
The p erfect information prices are p
m
H




for the high and the low qualit y resp ectiv ely . The case where (1 + v + c ) =2 ￿ v
is of no in terest since then the monop olist has no incen tiv e to separate when
her qualit y is H. Eliminating this case, then, the full information pro￿ts are
resp ectiv ely giv en by ￿
m
H






Under imp erfect information, assume that consumers kno w that the monop-
olist ma y b e of one of the tw o qualities, so that there are only tw o p ossible states
of Nature, denoted by (H) and (L) . Let ￿ denote a couple ( p; a ) of price and ad-
v ertising used by the monop olist. F or an y observ ation of ￿ the consumers form a
b elief ab out the pro duct qualit y . More precisely a b elief is de￿ned as a function
b ( ￿ ) indicating the probabilit y that the pro duct is of high qualit y . Then, giv en a
particular price and adv ertising com bination c hosen by the ￿rm, the consumer’s
exp ected utilit y is u ( ￿ )= b ( ￿ )( v + m ￿ p)+ ( 1 ￿ b ( ￿ ))( v ￿ p), with u ( ￿ )= u
H
if
b ( ￿ ) = 1 and u ( ￿ )= u
L
if b ( ￿ )= 0 .
A separating equilibrium, lo osely sp eaking, is constituted by strategies and
b eliefs with the prop ert y that ￿ ,s a y , is play ed if the state is H, and ￿
L
,s a y ,i s
play ed if the state is L, and the b eliefs are such that no deviation from these strat-
egy prescription is pro￿table. It is w ell kno wn that application of the elimination






w e shall not rep eat the argumen t here (see Milgrom and Rob erts 1986). This im-
plies that there are tw o necessary conditions for separation, they are resp ectiv ely:
( i ) (1 + v ￿ p) p ￿ a ￿ v; (2.3)
and
( ii ) (1 + v ￿ p)( p ￿ c ) ￿ a ￿ v ￿ c: (2.4)
Condition (i) states that a strategy ￿ can b e part of a separating equilibrium
only if the monop olist has no incentiv e to play ￿ if its qualit y is low. Condition
6qualit y ￿rm m ust then also protect its p osition, and it can do so only through
adv ertising. In terestingly , this typ e of adv ertising do es not serv e to separate from
existing ￿rms, but from p otential en tran ts, and therefore where observed it may
b e erroneously ascrib ed to other reasons not dep ending on imp erfect information
ab out qualit y . This typ e of adv ertising p ersists o ver time as long as the threat by
lower qualit y ￿rms p ersists, and it v aries in the same direction as demand v aries,
namely it v aries pro-cyclically .
Our explanation of the en try barrier attribute of adv ertising is not based up on
the e￿ects on consumers’ tastes, as adv ertising is here purely dissipativ e. It is
in teresting to note that in an article on limit pricing and adv ertising Bagw ell
and Ramey [1988] used price-adv ertising couples as informativ e strategies by an
incum b en t to signal its cost of pro duction to an en tran t. They found that purely
dissipativ e adv ertising could not b e used as an en try barrier.
Other mo dels (of rep eat-purchase) that are related to the study of exp erience
go o ds are the reputation mo dels like Klein and Le￿er [1981] and Shapiro [1983],
based on the imp ortance of qualit y premia for the inducemen t to a monop olist
to in tro duce a high qualit y instead of a low one (see also Riordan [1986]). In
this resp ect our analysis also has some consequences, in spite of the assumption
w e mak e that the typ es of the ￿rms are c hosen by Nature. Where ￿rms cannot
rely on rep eat purchase, in fact, a high qualit y can b e in tro duced only if it can
separate from the low qualities.
2. Monop oly in the Absence of Rep eat-Purc hase
The main implications of the analysis can b e deriv ed via a simple example, already
used for the monop oly case by Bagw ell and Riordan [1991], and here rearranged,
where needed, to in tro duce a v ertically di￿eren tiated duop oly
4
.
Consider a mark et where a monop olist sells a go o d that can b e of qualit y H
or L. Unit pro duction costs are c for the high qualit y and 0 for the low qualit y .
There are no ￿xed costs of pro duction, although the monop olist can v olun tarily
add a discretionary amoun t of ￿xed cost, a; in the form of w asteful adv ertising
campaigns. Eac h consumer buys either one unit or none. If the go o d is of qualit y
H the consumer’s utilit y after purchase is
u
H




Although sev eral examples exist (see Gabszewicz and Thisse[1979] seminal pap er, and
Shak ed and Sutton [1981]) we do not have yet a general theory of vertical di￿eren tiation in
oligoply under c omplete information. The authors hav e work ed out a set of necessary conditions
for a duop oly to b e de￿ned as vertically di￿eren tiated, and hav ec hecked that the main c harac-
ter of the analysis can b e preserv ed in that more general set-up. The exp osition, how ever, then
b ecomes mingled to conceptual issues p ertaining to the full information generalization of the
vertical di￿eren tiation mo dels that do not add any useful insigh ts while the di￿erence b et ween
our explanation of adv ertising and the traditional one b ecomes unclear.
5eac h ￿rm is a w are that the strategy it plays is liable to a￿ect the b eliefs that the
uninformed part y , here the consumers, holds ab out the other ￿rm’s typ e as w ell
as of its o wn typ e.
This feature of b eliefs do es not dep end on the num b er of informed parties|it
is evident that in the job mark et game of Sp ence [1973] there are man y w orkers
but the b eliefs of the emplo y er on the typ e of w orker Smith do not take in to
accoun t what w ork er Jones has sp en t on education
3
. It dep ends rather on the
prop ert y that the pa y o￿ (here the pro￿ts) of an informed play er dep ends up on
what the other play er do es (e.g. its pricing b ehavior), and on the fact that this
recipro cal dep endence is common kno wledge to all play ers.
The pap er pro ceeds as follo ws. First, in Section 2, the problem with one ￿rm
only is in tro duced and the notation established. The main reason for Section
2 rests not up on its no velt y but on the need to brie￿y clarify wh y in the ab-
sence of rep eat purchase the monop oly case is insu￿cien t to explain an y form of
adv ertising, and to pa ve the w a y for the remaining Sections.
Section 3, then, constitutes the core of the pap er. Tw o ￿rms comp ete, eac h
b eing of one among tw o p ossible typ es, eac h ￿rm kno ws its typ e and that of the
comp etitor while consumers do not observe the realized state of Nature but only
the strategies play ed by the ￿rms. On the basis of this observ ation consumers
form their b eliefs. The purp ose of the Section is that of deriving a c haracterization
of separating equilibria that do es not dep end on the b elief system adopted by
consumers. As a metho d, the approac h consists of writing do wn tw o necessary
conditions that the strategies play ed by the tw o ￿rms m ust satisfy in the states of
Nature when their qualities di￿er: these simply sa y that neither ￿rm m ust ￿nd it
pro￿table to mimic exactly the b ehavior of the riv al when their typ es di￿er. Only
using these tw o conditions it is sho wn that there are cases in whic h a separating
equilibrium, if it exists, must in v olv e the use of adv ertising by the high qualit y
￿rm if the qualit y typ es di￿er. The ￿rst task of the presen t researc h is therefore
accomplished in Section 3, since an explanation is pro vided for adv ertising that
do es not impinge on rep eat purchase.
The issue of existence of separating equilibria is solved in App endix 2, whic h,
howe v er, do es not dev elop a complete typ ology of p ossible b elief systems since
this is irrelevan t for our results and it w ould lead us astra y from the non-technical
issues that motiv ate the analysis.
In Section 4, the idea that en try ma y b e deterred through adv ertising is
examined using the results of Section 3. The Section presen ts an extension of
the basic mo del obtained in tro ducing the p ossibilit y that the duop oly mark et
structure b e contestable by a ￿rm whic h can also b e of tw o typ es: low and
"very low", and whic h can mimic the b ehavior of a low qualit y . A true low-
3
Similarly , if the industry is p erfectly comp etitiv e a ￿rm cannot a￿ect with its b eha vior the
b eliefs that consumers hold ab out the typ es of the other ￿rms. Khilstrom and Riordan [1984]
mo del therefore do es not share this feature.
4Second, as a cursory lo ok at television campaigns may con￿rm, ￿rms with
brands of long-established reputation also sp end considerable sums on adv ertis-
ing. This phenomenon cannot b e explained by Nelsonian theories, unless one
admits a constan t in￿ow of new consumers at eac h p erio d who are una w are of
the qualit y of the brand b eing adv ertised and who en ter a rep eat purchase pro-
cess. Another w a y out w ould b e to assume that consumers do not ha ve p erfect
recall|or that the c haracteristics of the pro ducts on the mark et c hange fast while
purchases happ en infrequen tly
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. It seems di￿cult to accept the idea ho we v er that
the magnitude of this in￿ow b e large enough to justify the large stream o v er time
of adv ertising exp enditures that one observes. Similarly , this typ e of adv ertising
is not encompassed by the explanation in Kihlstrom and Riordan since, although
they do not assume rep eat purchase, ￿rms need to adv ertise only in the in tro-
ductory phase.
Third, the empirical literature (as w ell as some non-signal theories of adv ertis-
ing like Dorfman and Steiner[1954] ) had long since noted the relative constancy
of the adv ertising-sales ratio of ￿rms o ver time (see for instance Sc hmalensee
[1972]). This means in particular that adv ertising v aries pro-cyclically .
F ourth, in v arious mark ets where ￿rms of higher qualit y comp ete against riv als
of low er qualit y , adv ertising by low qualit y ￿rms is conspicuous and sometimes it
compares to that of the high qualit y ￿rms.
The explanation pro vided in the presen t pap er encompasses all these four
typ es of adv ertising and it therefore enlarges the quota of adv ertising exp endi-
tures that can b e attributed to a signaling e￿ort by ￿rms. F urthermore, quite
surprisingly , the explanation w e pro vide con￿rms an old idea, namely that high
adv ertising exp enditures can b e used as a strategic en try barrier. It is w orth
emphasizing that the en try prev en ting attribute of adv ertising is derived in the
presen t pap er without recurring to ad ho c assumptions ab out the in￿uence of
adv ertising on consumers’ tastes.
The mo del b elo w abandons the rep e at pur chase (whic h ho we v er could b e rein-
tro duced at no cost) and the one-￿rm assumptions. It explicitly considers the
problem of ￿nding separating instrumen ts for the case where tw o ￿rms comp ete
on the same mark et. None of these tw o ￿rms has an established reputation but it
can b e of high or of low qualit y; therefore the consumers are confron ted with the
problem of in terpreting the price-adv ertising strategies of b oth ￿rms at the same
time. In teresting situations ma y arise that do not app ear in the monop oly case.
F or instance, a ￿rm ma y try and exploit the consumers imp erfect information
by copying the strategy adopted by its riv al. This typ e of mimic king b ehavior
is rather di￿eren t from the one to whic h the signaling literature in economics is
used: in our case, in fact, it is quite ob vious that if tw o ￿rms send the same
signal (whether along or outside the equilibrium path) then the consumers m ust
attribute them the same probabilit y of b eing of a giv en typ e. In other w ords
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31. In tro duction
The
1
explanation of adv ertising by Nelson [1974] is w ell kno wn. In a context
where consumers rep eatedly purchase an exp erience go o d|namely one of a qual-
it y that can b e learned only after purchase|apparen tly w asteful adv ertising cam-
paigns induce rational consumers to realize that the adv ertised brands sell a su-
p erior pro duct. Consumers w ould not re-purc hase the go o d after a ￿rst trial if
it w ere not of go o d qualit y , and the in tro ductory adv ertising costs could not b e
reco v ered in subsequent p erio ds.
Nelson argumen ts|that apply to an y form of w asteful exp enses by ￿rms and
not just to adv ertising|rest on rep e at pur chase . Along those lines sev eral authors
hav e dev elop ed rigorous mo dels to scrutinize the v alidity of Nelsonian theories
(see among others Milgrom and Rob erts [1986], Sc hmalensee [1982]; see also
Martin [1994] for a recen t survey). The limitation in the Nelsonian theory is that
it can accoun t only for in tro ductory adv ertising whic h is terminated after the
pro duct b ecomes kno wn. Moreov er, most of the literature considers the strategic
in teraction among one ￿rm and the p opulation of consumers. Kihlstrom and
Riordan [1984] represen t an exception since they consider a p erfectly comp etitiv e
industry with free en try , where ￿rms are price-tak ers. They obtain the result
that adv ertising equilibria can arise also when the in teraction among ￿rms and
consumers is not rep eated, pro vided the high qualit y ￿rms ha ve l ow e r v ariable
costs than their low qualit y riv als.
There seems to lac k a uni￿ed theory whic h can explain sev eral phenomena
related to adv ertising.
First, adv ertising or other w asteful and observ able selling exp enses are com-
mon in mark ets where consumption has a transient nature. Think for instance
to the o wners of restauran ts that crowd some touristic areas (this example is also
in Tirole [1989]), who in v est sometimes considerable sums in luxurious settings,
silv er cutlery ,n u m b er of w aiters, and the like, although they do not exp ect to
receiv e the same customers rep eatedly . One ma y observe that some restauran ts
will sp end money on these items and others will not. How ever, a theory based
on rep eat purchase cannot assign an informativ e role to these exp enditures.
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A bstr act
The presen t article pro vides a uni￿ed explanation for sev eral phenomena related
to adv ertising by ￿rms. (i) Adv ertising without rep eat purchase of the pro d-
uct, (ii) adv ertising from established brands, or p ost-in tro ductory , (iii) sim ul-
taneous adv ertising from low and high qualit y ￿rms, (iv) its p ersistence and
pro-cyclicalit y . The explanation is original b ecause it rests up on oligop olistic in-
teraction. The analysis hinges up on tw o fundamental results. The ￿rst is that
adv ertising allows separation when a signal via prices only do es not. The sec-
ond is that purely dissipativ e adv ertising can b e used to strategically deter en try .
Hence, a link is established b et w een en try deterrence and signaling.
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